Evolving social capital and networks in the post‐disaster rebuilding process: the case of Typhoon Yolanda by Tan‐Mullins, May et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evolving social capital and networks in the post-
disaster rebuilding process: The case of Typhoon 
Yolanda 
 Tan-Mullins, M., Eadie, P., Atienza, M.E. 
  
University of Nottingham Ningbo China, 199 Taikang East Road, Ningbo, 
315100, Zhejiang, China. 
 
First published 2020 
 
This work is made available under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0   
 
The work is licenced to the University of Nottingham Ningbo China 
under the Global University Publication Licence: 
https://www.nottingham.edu.cn/en/library/documents/research-
support/global-university-publications-licence.pdf 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Title: Evolving Social Capital and Networks in the Post Disaster Rebuilding 
Process: The Case of Typhoon Yolanda 
 
Abstract: Typhoon Yolanda brought major devastation to the local communities and 
infrastructure and also reshaped social structures and networks in the Philippines. 
During the immediate recovery process, bridging, bonding and linking social capital 
have had differential impacts and outcomes on how communities cope with the 
aftermath of the disaster. This paper investigates the interplay between the various 
types of social capital and their contributions to immediate coping strategies of 
Typhoon Yolanda communities. This paper also evaluates the complexity of defining 
social capital in a disaster context. In particular, it unpacks the blurring of the 
bridging and linking social capital at the immediate stage of rehabilitation in a post 
disaster context and its impacts on the social fabric of the communities. We deduce 
from this case study the social capital strategies necessary for a speedy recovery 
process both economically and socially for disaster-affected communities.    
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Typhoons are deadly, expensive and a regular occurrence in the Asia Pacific region. 
In 2015 alone, nearly 50 percent (43 out of 90) globally reported storms hit Asia 
Pacific countries, of which 33 of them were high-intensity cyclones/ typhoons 
(Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2015, p.1). Particularly, 
“Pacific typhoons are hitting Asia with more intensity, the proportion of storms that 
strike land as a category 4 and 5 in the Western Pacific is rising, because of warmer 
coastal waters” (Scientific American, 2016). The Philippines is located in the north 
western Pacific and is the first major landfall above the equator before continental 
Asia. This, with its warm waters and low-lying archipelagic coastline make it 
especially vulnerable to typhoons. With these factors, on average the Philippines 
suffers 20 typhoons annually.    
 
2 
 
On 8 November 2013, super-typhoon Yolanda hit the Visayas region of the 
Philippines, home to some of the poorest provinces in the Philippines.1 The storm tide 
(which is the combination of the storm surge and the normal high tide) reached 4.5 
meters high in places. Official figures indicate 6,193 individuals died, 1,061 went 
missing and 28,689 were injured (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2014). A vast area 
of agricultural land was devastated and whole towns were destroyed. Total damage 
was estimated at US$1,890,130,000 (National Disaster Risk Reduction Management 
Council, 2014) with the total number of people affected in terms of their livelihood, 
environmental and food security estimated at approximately 16 million. Of this 
number, nearly 4.4 million, or 30 percent, were displaced (National Economic and 
Development Authority, 2013: 3). Despite Philippine Foreign Aid Transparency Hub 
reporting that US$ 386,249,588.96 was received in international calamity aid and 
assistance2 after Typhoon Yolanda, poverty and livelihood concerns in the Eastern 
Visayas remain a serious issue and the rebuilding of sustainable communities in the 
longer term is an ongoing concern. (Interview, UNDP, 17 June 2017)   
 
The poor tend to be the most vulnerable to disasters as they are likely to live in 
vulnerable localities in insubstantial housing. It is also likely that financial or material 
safety nets will be limited or absent. Disasters like Typhoon Yolanda disrupt the 
fabric of community life and stress social systems (Fritz, 1961), and undermine the 
capacity “to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and stresses, and to adapt 
and grow from a disruptive experience” (Rodin, 2015: 3). The institutions and 
stakeholders tasked with devising mechanisms for resilience after environmental 
disasters must consider how social and environmental adaptations impact upon each 
other.  Resilience is also difficult to measure as it often involves spiritual and social 
capital and relates to intangible “assets” such as trust, faith, mental health and familial 
and community cohesion. As such, the ability to recover is very much embedded in 
                                                 
1 A distinction can be made within the Visayas with Eastern, Northern and Western Samar provinces 
recording higher poverty rates than Leyte (most number of poor families) and being in the top ten poorest 
provinces of the Philippines together with Negros Oriental in 2012 (NAPC). However, in the first half 
of 2014, Eastern Visayas (Region VIII) became the poorest region in the country (National Statistical 
Coordination Board, 2015).   
2 For the purposes of transparency the Philippine government set up the Foreign Aid Transparency Hub 
although critics (e.g. Orendain 2013) have questioned the accuracy and the efficacy of the Hub and the 
allocation of international donations. Social Watch Philippines has claimed that the 2016 government 
budget for the Yolanda Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program lacks transparency as money 
allocated to Yolanda victims has previously been diverted to other calamities (Aquino, 2015).  
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communities and has to be examined through the “social norms, social capital and 
social networks in which individuals are embedded, [as it] will determine disaster 
behaviour and the outcomes of a disaster” (Alcayna et al., 2016)  There are many 
factors that enable communities’ abilities to rebuild more efficiently in a post disaster 
context, and social capital is one important and well-discussed component of this 
process (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich and Meyer, 2015; Bankoff, 2007). 
 
Bourdieu first defined social capital as the “aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (1985, p. 248). 
Social capital can only function through networks, be they ethnic, clan or village, and 
accumulate through common narratives and understanding such as historical 
legitimacy, cultural coherence and economic reciprocity between the members of the 
community.  These common narratives then build trust between the actors through 
repetitive acts of reciprocity and strengthening the understanding between different 
actors and they enable the relationships to work.  
 
For communities susceptible to natural disasters, three types of social capital are 
identified as important for short-term coping capacity and for long-term resilience 
building strategies (Rossing et al, 2010). These are bonding, bridging and linking 
social capital. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) define bonding social capital as ties 
among people who are closely connected, such as immediate family members, 
neighbours, and close friends. Bridging social capital relates to ties among people 
from different geographical, occupational and ethnic backgrounds who have similar 
political and economic status.  This can exist in forms of remittance, migration and 
relief aid (from NGOs). Lastly, linking social capital are the ties between the 
community and people in positions of influence in formal organizations, such as 
schools, agricultural extension offices, the police, or local or national government 
entities (Rossing et al., 2010, 270).  It has been argued by scholars that linking social 
capital has a more vital role in affecting the immediate and mid-term rebuilding 
process in a disaster context. (Rossing et al., 2010; Atkinson, 2014; Bhandari, 2014; 
Islam and Walkerden, 2015; Rubin, 2016; Nakazato and Lim, 2017; Vachette et al., 
2017; Hillig and Connell, 2018) 
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However, the segregation of social capital into these three categories are at times 
unhelpful, especially in the immediate aftermath of a major disaster. Due to the 
disaster, institutions together with structures and networks, were fundamentally 
compromised. Government and security personnel lost their homes, possessions and 
relatives, and previously existing formal and informal structures of power and 
relationships were “washed away” by the typhoon, as many of the fatalities were 
occupants in positions of power or as patrons. At the same time, the lack of 
communication to the outside world and external communities in the immediate 
aftermath of disaster shuts down the possibility of activating bridging social capital. A 
major disaster with huge casualties and destruction to existing infrastructure and 
social structures, as observed with Typhoon Yolanda, reshapes the networks and 
actors supporting social capital in this context. This presents this case study with the 
question of how various types of social capital operate in a vacuum of networks and 
actors, and how they contribute to the immediate coping strategies of communities. 
 
To address this question, this article draws from a three year research project 
completed in 2017 funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council. The 
research team is comprised of academics from the University of Nottingham UK and 
China, and University of Philippines Diliman campus. The team draws knowledge 
from human geography, political science, sociology, development studies and disaster 
management studies, to assess how social capital is manifested through local 
structures and networks and its impacts in the immediate post-Typhoon Yolanda 
period. We argue that although bridging social capital plays a crucial role in the speed 
of response and recovery activities managed by the international NGOs, it is the 
linking social capital that is vital especially in the informal setting. In particular, we 
investigated the blurring of bridging and linking social capital by looking at how 
external NGOs exercise bridging social capital through disbursing aid relief, but this 
being manifested in the form of informal linking social capital in a form of clientism 
or patron-client relations in the Philippines. These new international actors, placed in 
a position of power and replacing formal institutions due to the destruction, prompted 
the blurring of formal and informal networks and institutions as well as between 
bridging and linking social capital.  By a holistic of assessment of the various type of 
social capital at work and their interaction with each other, we then examined the 
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extent to which social capital helped to reinforce or hinder communities’ resilience 
and abilities to rebuild in a post-disaster context.  
 
Our findings demonstrate that there is high fluidity in the boundaries between the 
different types of social capital in a disaster context. This means the typologies are at 
times unhelpful in identifying immediate coping strategies in a major disaster. The 
research also shows that this fluidity in the Filipino context, is a result of the existing 
cultural milieu of clientism, coinciding with the entrance of international aid agencies. 
This entrance altered the local social trust, formal and informal networks, and 
subsequently the capacity and speed of local communities to rebuild.  This paper 
concludes that in order for policy makers to formulate a sustainable and effective 
recovery strategy, they need to contextualise their policies by tapping in to the 
potential of these current and evolving local informal social structures and networks 
to support recovery strategies. The paper is divided into the following sections: the 
following section, section two, explains the background information on the research 
areas and the research design.  Section three reviews the literature on bridging, 
bonding and linking social capital through concepts of trust, networks, and patron-
client relationship in the context of Philippines and disaster management. In section 
four, we highlight examples of different types of social capital being activate in the 
immediate aftermath of the disaster, how one form of social capital fused into another, 
and its impacts (positive and negative) on the capacity of communities to rebuild.  
The concluding section discusses how this case contributes to the theoretical 
understanding of social capital in a disaster context and the implications of this 
research.  
 
2.  Background information of research area and research design   
 
In this study, we focus on 20 barangays3 of comparable size across three adjacent 
coastal Local Government Units (LGUs)4: Tacloban (8), Palo (6) and Tanauan (6) 
(see Map 1). All three LGUs suffered a similar degree of devastation as a result of 
                                                 
3 A barangay is the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines with elected officials.  
4  Local Government Units enjoy a degree of autonomy and decentralisation under the “Local 
Government Code of 1991”. However they are still accountable to the state. (Local Government Code 
of the Philippines, 1991) 
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Typhoon Yolanda.  In each LGU, we chose one least affected barangay as a control; 
the others were coastal and the most affected. Geography alone dictated our initial 
choice of barangays and we had no prior assumptions about the degree of social 
cohesion or effective leadership and capacity building within each barangay. The 
background information of these three LGUs are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Background statistics of research areas before Typhoon Yolanda 
LGU Barangays Total 
Population   
Estimated 
Poverty 
Incident  
Economy 
Tacloban 54, 54-A, 66-
A, 67, 87, 88, 
89, and 
Abucay (least 
affected) 
242,089 9.8 Tourism, higher education, 
health care hub/centre, 
commerce and main air 
transportation gateway to 
Eastern Visayas banking and 
finance capital  
Palo Cavite, Cogon, 
Libertad (least 
affected), 
Pawing, 
Salvacion, and 
San Joaquin 
70,052 17.9 Commerce and tourism, 
farming, buying and selling 
farm products, fermented 
coconut wine (tuba). 
Tanauan Bislig, 
Calogcog, 
Salvador (least 
affected), San 
Roque, Sta. 
Cruz, and Sto. 
Niño. 
55,021 28.9 Agriculture, livestock, 
fishing, forestry and mining, 
trade and industry, tourism, 
clay and other handicrafts 
 
Source: Philippine 2015 census available at:  https://psa.gov.ph/content/highlights-
philippine-population-2015-census-population; psa.gov.ph/content/psa-releases-2012-
municipal-and-city-level-poverty-estimates; www. tacloban.gov.ph/about/city-
profile/; field interviews and surveys.  
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Map 1: Research LGUS and barangays (Berja, 2019, p. 22 in Atienza (Ed), 2019) 
 
 
The region under study is also characterised by a growing population of increasingly 
impoverished households.  Official poverty statistics show 24.9 percent of Filipinos 
rated as poor in 2013 (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2014), with self-rated poverty 
running at around 50 percent (Social Weather Stations, 2015).  By 2014, based on the 
Annual Poverty Indicators Survey conducted by the Philippine Statistics Authority 
(PSA), the Eastern Visayas became the poorest region in the Philippines, reporting 
that “poverty incidence in the Eastern Visayas […] reached 54.9%, indicating that 
more than half of the region’s 4.10 million residents have incomes that fall below the 
annual threshold set per person” (Business World Online, 2015). 
 
This paper uses a mixed-method research approach and draws on in-depth interviews, 
focus group discussions (FGDs), surveys (for macro indicators) and participatory 
observations.  For qualitative methods, we interviewed the captains or chairs (elected 
executive official) from our chosen barangays and/or members of the barangay 
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councils. We also interviewed all three mayors of our LGUs and the vice mayors of 
Tacloban and Tanauan. In total, we conducted over 100 in-depth interviews with 
barangay captains, local mayors, local government officials, and the staff of 
international and national aid agencies, local businessmen and household 
representatives. We also organised 18 FDGs5 with local residents, asking questions 
about social interaction in the rehabilitation process. Through these questions, we 
teased out subtle values such as trust and norms, and how they manifest in various 
networks, which underpin the dynamics of how social capital works in a post disaster 
context. The information was additionally triangulated with quantities data from 800 
household surveys on an annual basis from 2015-2017. 40 families were interviewed 
in 2016 and 2017 in order to monitor their progress and identify common factors that 
threatened or facilitated their recovery. An overall picture can therefore be built 
revealing how and why disaster relief strategies work better or worse in different 
administrative units under similar conditions.  
 
3. Social capital, trust and norms in the Philippines disaster context 
 
Social capital is generally conceptualised as the “aggregate or potential resources that 
are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 248). 
Meanwhile, Lin presents social capital as a simple “investment in social relations with 
expected returns in the marketplace” (2001, p. 19), with the marketplace being 
understood as economic, political, labour based or other exchanges within 
communities. Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organization, such 
as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions” (1993, p. 167). Trust, norms and networks are 
subsequently used to identify indicators for this social capital (Schuller et al., 2000).  
“Trust can come from both generalized norms of morality and more personalized 
sources embedded in social networks” (Lyon, 2000, p. 664) and the employment of 
trust depends on the probability that other agents will behave in a way that is expected 
(Gambetta, 1988, p. 217).  This expectation of certain behaviours could be defined as 
                                                 
5  Details of our focus group questions are available here: http://www.projectyolanda.org/project-
yolanda/documents/project-yolanda-barangay-fgd-guide.pdf. Last accessed 6 June 2016. 
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norms and seen as the basis of building and maintaining personalized trust (Lyon, 
2000, p. 665). To hone the focus, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) note that there are 
many different types of trust in the Philippines.  Thick trust is defined by Putnam as 
“trust embedded in personal relations that are strong, frequent, and embedded in 
wider networks” (2000, p.136). In contrast “thin trust” or generalized trust is a 
person’s estimation of the general moral standards of the surrounding society, and in 
Filipino society, there is a scarcity of social cohesion and a lack of thin trust (Abad, 
2005; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005), however, thick trust in the Philippines is 
extremely strong, so much so that when members of one’s family makes a request of 
them, it is almost impossible to refuse.  That said, such forms of allegiance can also 
lead to negative forms of social capital such as the “in-group” acceptance of 
corruption and nepotism or criminal behaviour (Lin, 2001).   
In order for groups to come together and function as networks, they need a 
commonality or a common understanding or identity based on norms and similar 
practices, which is usually referred as culture. Culture, as defined by Krüger et al., is 
“a constantly changing and shifting configuration of social practices, or as outcomes 
of experiences, social arrangement and situations that were inscribed into society” 
(2015, p. 4). This understanding could be based on family ties, community relations, 
race and ethnicity or clans. These networks could be formal or informal and are 
intertwined with social capital embodied in trust relations among individuals 
(Crawford, 2006). These networks, while manifested through local structures, could 
often stretch across a number of scales, from networks within the community, to those 
that span district or regional boundaries, or even beyond international borders. This is 
evident in the context of Philippines when family or clan members migrate to capital 
cities or other countries in search of better livelihoods. According to Moser (1998) the 
communities that have good social networks and associations will be in a better 
position to fight poverty and vulnerability. 
 
Social capital has become a popular concept in development policy because it 
specifies a resource – a type of capital – to be tapped and strategically mobilized by 
individuals and groups to meet their needs (Cleaver, 2005; Fafchamps, 2006). As 
highlighted earlier, three types of social capital are identified as crucial for vulnerable 
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communities: bonding, bridging and linking. In the Philippines, recent studies based 
on national survey research have provided some valuable insights into the state of 
social capital in the archipelago (Abad, 2005; Porio, 2017). Both studies found that 
rich bonding capital among family and friends is pervasive in Filipino society, but 
most Filipinos lack bridging and linking capital, as well as lack associational ties. 
These findings confirm decades-old research about the strength of kin and friendship 
ties in Filipino society (Pal, 1966; Carroll, 1968; Morais, 1981). Exchanges of 
assistance within a network are often seen as acts of duty, love and care, and social 
capital in this country is usually a bottom-up phenomenon closely linked to social 
networks and notions of community and mutual labour; this is known in the 
Philippines as bayanihan (Gaillard, 2015, p. 78). This term originated in farming 
communities that were reliant on communal effort, especially during planting and 
harvesting times, and was based on mutual expectations, benefit and trust (Eadie and 
Su, 2018, p. 11).  Bayanihan is also important amongst poor communities that lack 
other forms of capital. Abad (2005) found that cooperation, as a communal coping 
mechanism akin to bonding social capital, is based on cultural norms such as 
bayanihan as opposed to associational regulations. Although bayanihan was first 
referenced in relation to the communal effort in agricultural communities “the 
tradition has diffused throughout Filipino society and is an expression of team spirit 
and sharing of labour” (Beza et al., 2018, p. 142). However, with increasing migration 
and emergence of new social actors into communities, networks were diluted and trust 
eroded, resulting in the weakening of bayanihan. This is especially evident in cities, 
such as the understudied city of Tacloban, where the population expanded rapidly 
from 80,707 in 1975 to 242,089 in 2015 (Philippine Statistics Authority 2015, p. 1).  
 
In the Philippines, patron-client relations is a category of linking social capital, which 
can connect people from different background and economic status, and it is a form of 
“thick trust”. It is comprised of informal ties between people and figures in position of 
influence and is based on a strong element of inequality and of differences in power 
between patrons and clients (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984, p. 48-49; Rossing et al., 
2010, p. 271). This relationship basically indicates a reciprocal relationship in which 
the patron will reward the client (monetarily, perhaps) to gain their loyalty or 
obedience (Wolf, 1966, p. 10).  Historically, patron-client relations in the Philippines 
have been rooted in patterns of land holding and ownership. The upper classes, or 
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patrons, enjoyed a monopoly over landownership in the Philippines whilst the lower 
classes, or clients, were dependent on them for wage labour or access to land. 
Clientelism in the Philippines is long standing and entrenched, as “debt peonage and 
share cropping fostered over time the growth of an inequitable agrarian social 
relationship in which the tillers of the soil were locked into dependency with the 
landlords” (Doronila, 1985, p. 100). Subsequently the landlord class diversified into 
industry and became government officials, this relationship evolving from between 
the landowner and tenant to become one between politician and voter (Anderson, 
1988; Simbulan, 2005). Sources of wealth diversified but remained concentrated 
within a few elite families who then later became powerful political families.  
 
To complicate matters, it is not fixed if a person is a patron or a client in the local 
context, but varies and alternates depending on who is the engaged actor in the 
network. This fluidity of this positioning is best illustrated at the barangay (village) 
level. At the local barangay level, a barangay captain may be the client when he needs 
help from the governor, mayor or national officials; or the situation may be reversed 
at other times where villagers need help from the captain. Thus, in the barangay 
context, the patron-client relationship is a highly fluid social relationship that allows 
power to shift from one actor to another, and with multiple power centres, which 
coexist in the barangay structure. The hierarchical top down nature of the government 
structure also hints that most of the power-holders (i.e. patrons) in the communities 
have either control of modes of production, the distribution of resources, or are the 
head of a government unit. Further compounded by the cultural traits of deference to 
authority, the poorer segments of the population rarely hold the status of a patron. At 
the same time, the barangay captain also holds positions of power in informal 
structures. For example, some barangay captains are also pastors and lead in the 
religious sphere of the community. This means they also hold positions of power in 
the informal realm, empowered by their knowledge of the sermon. However, this 
power balance has been altered by the remittances from overseas Filipino workers, 
which represent about 10 percent of the Philippines GDP, and these monetary flows 
increase after disasters. For example in “a year-to-year comparison, remittances to 
Philippines rose by $600million in the first three months following Haiyan” (Su and 
Mangada 2018, p. 67).  As such, this reduced the reliance of families on these local 
patrons and subsequently altered the political control of these patrons.  
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To summarize, there has been a substantial amount of literature written about social 
capital and patron-client relationships and how they play out in the Filipino context 
(Doronila, 1985; Lande, 1964; Sidel, 1999; Quimpo, 2005). Recently scholars have 
also began to investigate how the different types of social capital and networks could 
affect and be altered by the emergency management of disasters in both short and 
long term periods (Ackinson, 2014; Bhandari, 2014; Islam and Walkerden, 2015; 
Rubin, 2016; Nakazato and Lim, 2017; Vachette et al., 2017; Hillig and Connell, 
2018). However, very little research looks at the difficulties of typologising social 
capital, the interaction between the types of social capital, or how communities utilise 
different social capital at the immediate stage in an event of a major disaster. More 
crucially, there are gaps in the analysis of how categories of social capital transcend 
and evolve when mapped onto the local informal structures and networks such as 
patron-client relations.  Hence, in the following sections this paper will investigate the 
above in the case of Typhoon Yolanda.  
 
4. Social capital at work- immediate aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda 
 
When Typhoon Yolanda struck, tasks such as burying the dead, clearing the streets of 
debris, tending to the injured, and the provision of food and water were major 
challenges. The scale of disaster dictated that primary responsibility for response and 
recovery was escalated to the national level. This was due to several reasons. First, the 
LGUs tasked as first responders were wounded themselves. Formal local institutions 
such as government agencies were partially destroyed, both physically and the human 
resource supporting it. Because of these things being absent, bridging social capital 
was dominant, which opened up “spaces of opportunity” for new stakeholders such as 
international Non-governmental Organisations (NGO).  Support and capital flows 
from these and other external communities were felt strongly in the immediate 
aftermath of Yolanda.  This was verified by the accumulative survey data from 2017 
as listed in Table 2 responding to the question of ‘Which are the top (three) 
organizations that helped you the most?’ International NGO ranked first in all three 
LGUs.  
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Table 2: Which are the top (three) organizations that 
helped you the most? 
  
Palo  Tacloban Tanauan 
Self/Family 25.0 24.8 37.6 
Municipality/City government 28.3 28.0 39.2 
Barangay government 11.7 2.8 44.7 
National government 76.3 63.2 27.0 
Provincial government 1.7 1.3 0.4 
International NGO 90.8 87.7 87.8 
Local NGO 31.7 3.9 3.0 
Foreign Government 22.9 15.7 0.8 
No response 0.8 0.0 1.7 
Other 4.2 1.6 1.3 
Number of respondents 240 318 237 
 
 
This huge influx was not surprising, given the disaster’s scale and severity, and 
survivors were reliant on outside help. This was because the typhoon triggered an 
international outpouring of donations to the affected communities. The large flow of 
NGO actors into the region is also due to the compromised core government functions 
at the local and provincial level. Although the national government is listed as the 
second most helpful organization in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, very little 
linking social capital was activated in this context as there were no prior direct contact 
between the national level actors with the local actors to allowing the building of 
networks and accumulation of social capital.  Additionally, bonding social capital does 
not have a huge role to play as most family members or relatives were in similar 
situation of vulnerability (see table 2 for more information).   
 
Although bridging social capital, embodied by the numerous NGO institutions, was 
prominently at work at the formal level in the immediate aftermath of Typhoon 
Yolanda, a parallel and more subtle type of social capital was also evident at an 
informal level.  In the immediate aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda and in instances 
where pre-disaster networks were still partially active, informal linking social capital 
within existing networks was immediately reactivated and reinforced. The surviving 
patrons, such as the barangay captains who were working with NGOs, were heavily 
involved in compiling lists of residents in their barangays that qualified for aid. Some 
captains used this position of power to prioritize aid to their allies/families. By 
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tapping in to the bridging social capital, these captains reactivate their linking social 
capital and their relatives or friends were prioritised on the beneficiary list.  
 
Residents that participated in focus group discussions (FGDs) for this research 
confirmed that those who were perceived to oppose the barangay captains politically 
were excluded from the lists of recipients of aid while other residents noted that those 
known or favourable to the barangay captains were identified as beneficiaries, even 
when they did not need much help (FDGs, Tanauan, 12 December 2016; Tacloban, 12 
September 2016). This meant that some members of the communities did not qualify 
for aid from government and international organisations. Some residents attending the 
FGDs also complained that barangay captains and even municipal officers skimmed 
off the best goods (imported goods were regarded as premium) for themselves, whilst 
others still reported that their captains were scrupulously fair. There were also reports 
from interviews and FGDs that barangay captains who were allies of the mayors got 
more assistance for their barangays than those who were not.  
 
Hence, both bridging social capital (at formal level) and linking social capital (at 
informal level in patron-client form) were observed to be at work simultaneously and 
mutual beneficially during this immediate period of chaotic aid allocation. However, 
information, often controlled by social capital, resulted in some areas not receiving 
aid while others received too much. On the one hand, this inequitable distribution of 
aid had and will have a knock-on effect in terms of trust, thus affecting bridging 
social capital between the NGOs and the local communities. On the other hand, the 
entrance of NGOs into Filipino society as new patron, a “giver” of goods and favours, 
has reinforced the patron-client relations and has enforced the informal linking social 
capital of these NGOs in the middle of the recovery process. The blurring of these 
social capital and parallel processes at work will be illustrated in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the allocation of aid became a chaotic, 
complex and a political process, especially as there were 515 organisations involved 
in the relief effort (out of which 178 were international organisations, 98 were 
national agencies, 165 were regional organisations and 74 were local units) (Saban, 
2015, p. 1503). Aid agencies implemented their own criteria to identify the neediest 
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and undertook their own surveys to distribute aid independently. Table 3 illustrates a 
non-exhaustive list of government agencies, IO and NGOs involved in aid distribution 
in the immediate and mid to long term period of the disaster. In the barangays, tools, 
equipment, and sanitation products were among the first items to be distributed to 
cope with the trauma and insecurity that were evident in the immediate post-disaster 
period.  
 
Table 3 Organisations and activities 
 
Type of 
Organisations 
Name of 
Organisation 
Immediate Activities (first 
six months) 
Mid to Long-
Term Activities 
Government  Dept. of Social 
Welfare and 
Development 
(DSWD) 
(regional, 
provincial and 
municipal)  
Food, water and shelter 
assistance, clearing of 
debris, rebuilding 
communications 
Cash for work; 
national 
KALAHI-
CIDDS 
livelihood 
program for 
barangays 
Government Bureau of 
Fisheries and 
Aquatic 
Resources 
(BFAR) 
Assessing damage, 
supporting clearance 
Boats 
International 
NGO 
Catholic Relief 
Services (CRS) 
Food, water, shelter, 
sanitation, medicine 
assistance, rebuilding 
temporary shelters 
Shelter, 
livelihood 
programs, 
WASH 
programs, 
DRRM 
National 
NGO 
Women’s 
Education, 
Development, 
Productivity and 
Limited food, water, 
shelter, medicine 
assistance,  psychological 
counselling 
Livelihood 
programme 
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Research 
Organization 
(WeDpro) 
Government Dept. of Labour 
and 
Employment 
(DOLE) 
Limited food, water and 
shelter assistance, clearing 
of debris, documentation 
for compensation 
Cash for work 
National 
NGO / 
International 
NGO 
Center for 
Emergency Aid 
and Response, 
Inc. 
(CONCERN) / 
Change des Vies 
(CECI) 
Food, water, shelter, 
medicine and sanitation 
assistance, clearing of 
debris, enhancing the  
rebuilding of 
communication channels, 
temporary shelters 
Livelihood 
programme 
International 
NGO 
Active Citizens 
Foundation 
(ACF) 
Food, water, shelter, 
medicine assistance, 
clearing of debris    
Livelihood for 
fisherfolk 
International 
NGO 
Oxfam Food, water, shelter, 
sanitation, medicinal 
assistance, clearing of 
debris, enhancing the  
rebuilding of 
communication channels, 
temporary shelters 
Livelihood 
programme and 
cash for work 
Government Dept. of Interior 
and Local 
Governments 
(DILG) 
Limited food, water and 
shelter assistance, clearing 
of debris, documentation 
for compensation 
Boats 
International 
Government 
US Government  Food, water and medicinal 
assistance, clearing of 
debris, rebuilding shelters 
Livelihood 
programmes 
International 
NGO 
Ministry without 
Borders 
Food, water and medicinal 
assistance, clearing of 
Boats 
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debris, rebuilding shelters 
Local NGO Magsaysay 
transport 
Food, water and medicinal 
assistance, clearing of 
debris 
Boats 
International 
NGO 
Tzu Chi Food, water and medicinal 
assistance, clearing of 
debris 
Cash for work 
International 
Organisation 
United Nations 
Development 
Programme 
(UNDP) 
Food, water and medicinal 
assistance, clearing of 
debris, building temporary 
shelters 
Cash for work 
International 
government 
agency  
United States 
Agency for 
International 
Development 
(USAID) 
Food, water and medicinal 
assistance, clearing of 
debris, rebuilding 
communication, building 
temporary shelters 
Start-up funds 
for sari-sari 
stores and food 
stalls  
 
 
Both the influx of aid agencies and the independent assessments of the need of aid 
have implications that were driven by the lack of coordination between some of the 
agencies listed in Table 3, and the involvement of numerous stakeholders led to the 
fragmentation of the strategic and operational resilience building processes (Vachette 
et al., 2017, p. 315). This fragmentation has resulted in the duplication of aid and 
projects, which is common in the chaotic immediate aftermath of a major disaster.  
This was also cited in an interview with an anonymous international NGO worker, 
who confirmed that coordination within and between different NGOs is a major issue 
in terms of effective aid allocation. Another example was from captain of Barangay 
88 in Tacloban, reported that: 
60 percent of livelihood pre-Yolanda was fishing. There were 600 
fishermen pre-Yolanda. There were more than 200 boats pre-Yolanda, 
some big enough to accommodate 10 men, others only two men.  Some 
donors did not cooperate with us, so even those who are not fishermen 
received boats. Because they [donors] went directly to the people. There 
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are more than 300 boats now [an increase of 50 percent). Some who 
received boats are not even fishermen and did not use the boats (2015). 
 
Meanwhile the captain of barangay Sta. Cruz in Tanauan also reported that:  
Marsman was the first group to give boats (36 units). Other groups 
followed in giving boats to residents. However, not everyone received 
boats from NGOs. Sometimes, one fisherman got about three to four boats, 
which were not used. These groups did not coordinate with the barangay 
council and gave the boats directly to the residents  (2015). 
 
With multiple organisations and initiatives happening concurrently with haphazard 
coordination, it is not surprising that in 2015, 49.7 percent of our surveyed 
respondents reported that they were given duplicate aid (more of the same thing) 
(Berja 2015, p. 14).  Although there was some institutional coordination, not all 
agencies subscribe or are part of this centralised process. At the same time, due to 
limitations of national coordinating mechanisms and the sheer number of 
organisations coming in, it was difficult to keep track of everything. More worryingly 
78.9 percent of the communities interviewed reported that they did not receive any 
training or equipment for livelihood (Berja 2015, p. 15)6.    
 
One inevitable question is why certain places/ sectors are more effective in capturing 
aid than others. In our research, fishermen tended to be favoured recipients of 
equipment and aid, and in some cases across the three localities, individual fisherman 
were given up to three boats by different donors (interviews with barangay captains 
November 2015). This is because boat donations create positive public relations for 
the donor agencies, which could encourage more donations to that particular agency. 
(Tan-Mullins et al., 2007) What this means for social capital is that aid distribution 
between NGOs and local recipients (fishermen) exhibits traits of reciprocal patron-
client relations. Fisherfolk are particularly prioritized as “recipients” as they are able 
to benefit the organisations in a certain way, in this case, positive publicity for the 
organization. However, this unequal relationship does not only result in disintegrated 
                                                 
6 Our interviews were conducted during working hours so it is possible that those who did receive 
livelihood training were at work.  
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social relations within communities, it often results in greater competition among the 
original fisherfolk, with boats also having been given to non-fisherfolk. More 
importantly, the increase in fishing boats and subsequent fishing activities depletes 
fishery resources and threatens the long-term sustainability of their environment and 
livelihoods. In addition, this is also destroying trusts within communities and 
subsequently the social networks that gel communities together.  
 
As alluded to earlier, the uncoordinated outpour of donations and huge influx of aid 
and cash during the immediate period, combined with a lack of coordination, had 
created duplication and unequitable distribution of aid. This in turn affected trust 
between the different members of the communities. What was also destructive in the 
process is that it also created a “dole out mentality”, introduced during the Marcos 
years7 and further strengthened by patronage politics. In a disaster context, it could be 
termed as “dependency mentality” in which relief undermines initiative’ (Harvey and 
Lind, 2005: 5). One of the barangay captains in Palo, Darina Romero from Libertad, 
reported to our Singaporean researcher on 9 November 2015, that aid dependency was 
a problem and she noted that “people will not attend meetings unless there is some 
kind of aid to be distributed. There are still people who are jobless and waiting for 
handouts”.  Our Tacloban-based researcher reported that even before Yolanda, people 
were not interested in attending meetings or activities unless they got something from 
it. What is observed here is that the local informal patron-client relations have been 
transposed onto NGOs as patrons and givers of aid, while the local communities see 
themselves as clients and reinforce informal linking social capital in the local context.   
 
Indeed, our findings indicate people “invest” in social capital/relationships because 
they have the expectation of some sort of return (Brisson and Usher, 2005, p.644). 
These returns may be uncertain after the shock of a disaster, and the inability of 
governments or relief agencies to set up credible flows of information or manage the 
distribution and use of resources inhibits bonding social capital. As alluded to above, 
some households will not attend meetings if there are no “gifts” or “aid” given out 
                                                 
7 Tacloban is the hometown of former first lady Imelda Marcos. The Marcos family has been particularly 
critical of the Aquino government in their handling of the Yolanda relief effort. The Mayor of Tacloban 
during Haiyan, Alfred Romualdez, is Imelda Marcos’ nephew (Antiporda and Tolentino, 2015; Pangue, 
2015).  
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during or after the meetings.  These expected acts of reciprocity were further 
confirmed by our last round of interviews with barangay officials, repeating that those 
who are constantly present in barangay assemblies are the recipients of the 
conditional cash transfer program and livelihood programs (DSWD’s KALAHI-
CIDDS) of the Philippine government.  If that return is uncertain, the investment will 
not be made. We also discovered that the manner in which goods were distributed by 
some governmental and non-governmental relief agencies was dictated by programme 
time limits and the need to be “seen” doing something meaningful by donors, the 
public and those in charge. This meant that, in some cases, the distribution of 
“visible” materials goods was prioritised over less visible tasks such as the 
comprehensive monitoring of the equitable allocation of goods and services.  
 
In some instances, the situation was worsened by particular practices of certain 
NGOs. For example, the Taiwanese Buddhist organization Tzu Chi Foundation is 
very popular among many Typhoon survivors.  Based on the interviews with 
barangay captains and FGDs, people remember Tzu Chi fondly because they gave 
away cash instead of cash-for-work programs, vouchers or equipment. Tzu Chi 
simply asked people to put their names on a list and gave cash to people who were in 
line. During the relief phase, Tzu Chi gave more generous amounts of cash than their 
counterparts which distorted the standard rates agreed upon by the other agencies 
(Thin, 2014). In some cases, the Foundation paid PHP 500 per day cash for work but 
also distributed cash for relief of “PHP 8,000 to families with 1-2 members, PHP 
12,000 to those with 3-4 members and PHP 15,000 to families with 5 members and 
up” (Nadal, 2014) with no checks on where it was being spent (Brondiale, 2013). As 
late as 2015, Tzu Chi was one of the few organisations left who still disbursed aid 
with dedicated recipients. Furthermore, there were reports that they were still giving 
away cash even when the focus should have been on rehabilitation instead of relief.   
 
If we propose that NGOs have assumed positions as patrons in the local structure, 
then one should question why Tzu Chi seemingly did not act like a patron and 
“demand” any forms of “returns” from the communities. One possible explanation is 
that Tzu Chi is a Buddhist religious organization, with a very different ethos for aid 
disbursement compared to professional international and local aid agencies. The 
organisation sees aid as a way of giving back to society with no request for returns in 
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order to accumulate karma, which will lead to positive elevation in the afterlife. 
However, our Singaporean researcher also found many printed materials on 
Buddhism in the Tzu Chi office during the interview that are generally distributed to 
the recipients to spread the faith.  However, this very subtle expectation of spreading 
the faith without demand of actual conversion leads to a confusion of cultural 
expectations, as no returns are required because conversion is not demanded. This 
further erodes the trust within the communities, as they could not comprehend why 
certain people were getting aid and how.   
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In the immediate period after disaster struck, the ability to secure resources through 
various types of social capital nested in existing networks was evident and provided 
access to various resources in disaster situations.  Research has shown that a strong 
embeddedness into the lower social network with high level of trust will enhance the 
ability of communities or households to rebuild better and faster in times of disasters 
or crisis (Elliott, Haney, & Sams-Abiodun, 2010; Hurlbert et al., 2000; Kaniasty and 
Norris, 1993, Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004, and Tobin-Gurley et al., 2010). 
Additionally, Vachette, King and Cottrell (2017, p. 328) found in a disaster context of 
the Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu, that bonding and bridging social capital are vital to the 
success of managing the diversity of stakeholders involved through effective 
communication pathways and continuous bonding and bridging strategies. This is also 
partly due to the possible negative impacts of linking social capital in the post-disaster 
context, due to key differences in power or social relations. According to Rubin 
(2016), linking social capital is often subordinated to the previous two related social 
capital concepts and is often exclusively defined and operationalized based on 
expressions of organizational trust and participation, especially in disaster settings.   
 
However, our evidence indicates that linking social capital in the immediate post 
disaster context is more complex, as it exist in both formal settings and informal 
setting. In the three LGUs, it is the formal bridging social capital and informal linking 
social capital that plays a vital role in the immediate aftermath of a major disaster, 
especially when pre-existing structures are partially or fully destroyed. This is partly 
due to the high number of fatalities in the local context which dismantle the bonding 
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social capital structures, and also the high influx of external informal agencies in 
providing aid relief reinforced by bridging social capital. Subsequently, these external 
aid agencies who are prominent in the formal structure, easily shifted into the 
informal local structure, exercising linking social capital and by replacing the 
positions of patrons. Through their aid giving activities, the presence of NGOs further 
destabilised the pre-existing social networks and reinforce the patron-client mentality 
in the Filipino society.  
 
Furthermore, the existing social networks and cohesiveness of communities were 
affected by unequitable distribution of aid, which created distrust in the communities. 
In some cases, this led to simmering resentment within communities, and whilst this 
can be dismissed as petty jealousy, the perception of unfairness or exclusion can have 
a “profound effect on people’s self-confidence and civic and political connectedness” 
(Ong et al., 2015, p. 42). As such, the impacts of inequitable distribution (intentional 
or unintentionally) undermined the growth of resilient and cohesive communities by 
destroying trust and existing social capital networks.  
 
Finally, the entrance of new agencies into the Typhoon Yolanda context has 
transfigured the social networks and capital in the local communities in the immediate 
and mid-term recovery period in the local context. According to Robles and Ichinose 
(2016, p. 84), the presence of emergent groups with no existence prior to the crisis 
will affect the trust within communities due to the change in social connections.  
Compounded by the embedded mind-set of clientelism in the Philippines in this post-
disaster context, where the roles of local and national government officials and 
politicians were disrupted due to the sheer scale of the disaster, some humanitarian 
agencies replaced “patrons”; whilst locals were grateful for their help, they also 
expect to be “bought”, in other words receive a “dole out”. This patron-client 
relationship also means that communities that received help from international 
agencies are less likely to be critical of those agencies as this would be akin to 
disloyalty to the patron (Ong et al., 2015).   
 
In terms of policy implications, our research demonstrates resilience-building 
strategies in post-disaster context must be crafted with reference to specific local 
socio-economic contexts if they are to be sustainable, effective and properly 
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understood. Disaster resilience is often related to the management of change or 
disturbance with the aim of sustainable material wellbeing. Put another way, the 
Department for International Development (DFID) refers to resilience as “maintaining 
or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses” (2011, p. 6). 
Disasters inform resilience as they are the moment when “the public and its problems 
are brought into clear view” (Chandler, 2014, p. 147), and the “natural” order of 
things is tested. Resilience-building strategies are seldom linear and often context-
dependent. Indeed, as indicated by Rigg et al., “natural events may appear cruelly 
random but their impacts, who they affect and how, the degree of resilience that 
societies and individuals exhibit, and the trajectories of recovery, are far from 
random” (2008, p. 138).  
 
The cultural and social context of a disaster is therefore important, and post-disaster 
situations can cause rapid change in social and material terms. Our findings indicate 
that the poor management of much-needed material aid, sometimes inevitable during 
a disaster of the scale of Typhoon Yolanda, can undermine community cohesion and 
the social fabric of these communities in the long term by eroding trust in these 
communities. Moreover, aid agencies become regarded as patrons in a highly unequal 
power relationship, further constraining local people in expressing their views. An 
acceptance of hierarchy is central to clientelism and this undermines “bottom up”, 
community driven rehabilitation strategies as people are less willing to speak up 
against their “patrons”. Moreover, the transient nature of the aid agencies, i.e. they 
leave between six month to two years after the disaster, also means this new 
relationship is  temporary, which again will inhibit the rebuilding process in these 
communities, as households and individuals will need to rebuild their social network 
and capital when these agencies leave. This can potentially have a long-term 
detrimental impact on communities’ ability to rebuild and can also distort the data that 
researchers and aid agencies gather.  This finding was confirmed by Ong et al. (2015), 
saying that communities’ relationships with aid agencies are also animated by the 
patron-client culture that pervades Filipino politics, especially at the local level.  As 
such, the importance of this research is its delving into the social structures and 
relations, such as the patron-client relations, to better co-create rebuilding strategies 
for the affected communities in post disaster context. Otherwise, vulnerability will 
remain, rehabilitation will be compromised, and adaptation may only be partial or 
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ineffective, thus stymieing the social as well as physical reconstruction of 
communities. 
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